The Equality Act 2010, in its content and passage through Parliament, provides a rare example of an Act that engages, to some extent, with all seven foundations of legal knowledge (the English compulsory subjects upon which other legal subjects build). This article examines the Equality Act 2010 through the prism of the foundations and, in light of ongoing reform, contends that while anti-discrimination law is an important subject it should not join the list of foundations but rather that awareness and appreciation of those foundations can provide a richer understanding of such laws as the Equality Act 2010.
Introduction
The Equality Act 2010 was designed to unify, simplify and strengthen the myriad pieces of British anti-discrimination law which had emerged over the previous 40 years as more and more grounds (or protected characteristics) were introduced and amendments to legislation (often European-derived) were made.
1 Alongside this illustrious, and partially fulfilled, aim, the Equality Act 2010 also has a number of other distinguishments. It was one of the last Acts of the Labour Government of 1997 -2010, receiving Royal Assent during Prorogation, and the first to trial interleaving the explanatory notes with the Bill so as to aid user engagement, making it more accessible to both the specialist and the general reader. with the necessary knowledge to enable them to break into new areas of law. 10 While the concept of there being seven foundations has been subject to strong criticism by some eminent academics, notably Peter Birks, 11 the general concept of a general grounding has proved enduring within the qualifying law degree and the postgraduate conversion course (the Legal Executive route, by contrast, having early specialisation as a hallmark). 12 Indeed, the current Legal Education and Training
Review, while not wanting to pre-empt further work by the regulatory bodies regarding outcomes, noted that 'the range of evidence points to the existing Foundation subjects as a reasonable proxy for what is required' 13 but has recommended that there should be further limited prescription as to what is required within the subjects.
14 For the foundations to have any worth, it is inevitable that the wide range of other topics -to quote Peter Birks the 'hundred others' that the professions 'could not care less about' (and including 'very important subjects' which he feared could be 'starved to extinction while all available energy is applied to the sustenance of the 10 Advisory Committee on Legal Education and Conduct, First report on legal education and training (ACLEC 1996) , 117 (Annex D). 11 Who, eg, referred to 'to this miserable list of now seven compulsory subjects' and opined that 'professions' systematic indifference to the well-being of all but seven subjects is not only myopic but bewildering' (P Birks, 'Compulsory Subjects: Will the Seven Foundations ever Crumble? ' [1995] subjects which are strong and abundant') 15 -build on at least one of the foundations.
Thus, labour law is founded on contract and tort (with some public law), company law on equity and contract, and the law of armed conflict on crime and public law, etc.
While some subjects, family law for example, could conceivably touch on all of the English foundations, 16 it is unusual for a single Act do so. The content of the Equality Act 2010, and the circumstances of its creation, cause it to engage -to varying extents -with all seven.
However, it is worth considering whether the seven foundations achieve their aim of providing "[legal practitioners] … with the necessary knowledge to enable them to break into new areas of law …" and the Equality Act 2010 is a topical and arguably capacious prism through which to do that. Discrimination (or equality) law may not be a mainstream academic subject and it does not, and arguably should not, form one of the distinct foundations but 'familiarity, knowledge, awareness and appreciation' of those foundations can provide a richer understanding of the scope, complexity and the context of what is nonetheless an important piece of legislation. If the seven foundations are a good basis for legal education, one might reasonably expect some of them to be reflected in any legal topic. It is suggested, as examined below, that the Equality Act is, in fact, a (rare) example of an Act which does reflect all seven foundations of English law.
The Equality Act 2010: General framework and the Law of Tort
As Sandra Fredman noted in 2001, ' [t] here is no general equality guarantee; instead, a relatively sophisticated set of anti-discrimination statutes operates within a narrow area'. Back then there were only four main protected grounds or characteristics (the original two from the 1970s of sex and race, with the addition of disability in 1995 and gender reassignment in 1999). 17 The years since have seen the area increase in size, with a number of new Acts passed and Regulations tabled, and then the subsequent unification of those nine main pieces of legislation 18 into the single Equality Act; but the lack of a general equality guarantee remains. Then, and now, British anti-discrimination law primarily sets outs to prohibit certain activities with regard to certain characteristics in certain circumstances and it does so through creating a statutory tort. The Equality Act 2010 is principally a restatement of the tort. 21 The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 adopted a different template (and had different aims) but nonetheless still defined discrimination and then outlawed certain activities. discrimination). Subsequent sections rendered it unlawful to discriminate in, for example, offering employment (s.6(1)), dismissing someone (s.6(2)), providing education (s.22), providing goods and services (s.29), and so forth. While the framework was general there were a number of differences in definitions and scope, due in no small part to the effect of European Law (see below). These differences included, for example, the definition of direct discrimination for sex and age adopting a claimant-specific formulation (e.g. on grounds of her sex) whereas for race, religion or belief and sexual orientation the less favourable treatment did not have to be because of the claimant's own characteristic (and thus allowed claims by association or due to perception). There were also myriad precise definitions of indirect discrimination (but to the broad effect given above) and, in the case of religion or belief and sexual orientation, protection was spread over two pieces of legislation each (drafted using different indirect discrimination terminology). The Equality Act 2010 has brought a welcome rationalisation of definitions while retaining the general framework with the definitions of prohibited conduct followed by the prohibitions in the areas of goods, facilities, services and public functions (Part 3), premises (Part 4), work (Part 5), education (Part 6) and associations (Part 7).
22
The province of tort over the Equality Act 2010, and the predecessor legislation, is clear. explicitly refer to the non-employment provision (such as that quoted above) and it is 'well established' that for the purposes of compensation they should be treated as a claim in tort. 25 The Equality Act 2010, for the most part, consolidates the previous law and continues to define compensation for non-employment and employment-related discrimination in this way, although it now says that the county court has power to grant any remedy which could be granted in the High Court in proceedings in tort rather than, as formerly, referring to 'any other claim in tort'. to deny that bed and breakfasts amount to a boarding house or similar establishment as the number of meals provided in the former is less but this has been given short shrift by the courts. 41 However, there is a peculiarity in that the Premises provisions include a small premises exception whereby if the premises are sufficiently small 42 then some prohibitions regarding premises, such as offering a right to occupy, do not apply (unless the characteristic is race). 43 Accordingly, where accommodation is provided to those who do not 'live elsewhere' the exception could be relied on whereas letting out rooms in the same size of property to those who are on holiday does not fall within this limited exception. 44 This seems to give greater protection to holidaymakers than those in need of accommodation. The Act is silent on how the agreement will bind the land and afford effective . 42 Where the D and his/her household reside in one part and the other part is not sufficient to provide accommodation to more than 6 other people comprising no more than two other households (sch 5, para 3). 43 Equality Act 2010, ss 33(1) and 35(1) prohibiting discrimination in the disposal of and management of premises, s 38(4) defining disposal and sch 5, para 3(2) excluding race. 44 The and scope of the presumption is not without ambiguity, but the explanatory notes state that the presumption is 'a presumption that a man who transfers property to his wife, child or fiancée is making the recipient a gift of that property, unless there was evidence to the contrary', 47 whereas there is no such presumption when the transferor is a woman. The presumption has been criticized as belonging to a different era 48 and it is clearly sex discriminatory but there were alternatives to abolition. As Lord who considered it to be 'an abuse of the legal technique for ascertaining or imputing intention to apply to transactions between the post-war generation of married couples "presumptions" which are based upon inferences of fact which an earlier generation of judges drew as to the most likely intentions of earlier generations of spouses belonging to the propertied classes of a different social era'. been solved had equity been able to extend the presumption of advancement to unmarried couples and remove the sex discrimination [but] the tool which equity has chosen to develop law is the "common intention" constructive trust'. 49 In other jurisdictions, the presumption has been taken to include mothers as well as fathers, 50 although it has been removed between spouses. property derived from housekeeping money is shared equally whether the money came from husband to wife or wife to husband or indeed between civil partners).
However, as Brightwell notes, ''the change was made with no parliamentary debate, following the introduction of an amendment during the passage of the Act in the House of Lords'. 52 The undue haste with which this amendment was made has to some extent, albeit less satisfactorily, been mitigated by the pronounced delay in deciding whether to bring it into force.
The Equality Act 2010 and Equity
The common law freedom to discriminate in disposition by gift or trust has, as adumbrates public law as including 'Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Human Rights' 65 and it is in that context in which it is used here.
The Equality Act 2010 falls within the embrace of Public Law in a number of ways. Not only does it refine a core concept underpinning the law, both public and private, but discrimination within the provision of public services is among the specified areas where discrimination is prohibited as a statutory tort (unless subject to exceptions). 66 In this respect it has harmonized the pre-existing provisions and . 66 The prohibition is in Equality Act 2010, s 29 and is subject to exceptions in schedule 3. 67 Despite the prominent placing of the provisions right at the start of the Act, coverage of socioeconomic inequality was intended to be weaker than other matters. It did not fall within the protected characteristics and the duty was intended to be a lesser duty than that imposed by the other public duties, on a potentially different grouping of public authorities, simply requiring socio-economic inequalities to be considered when making strategic decisions. The Coalition Government declined to implement it on the basis that it was unnecessary and potentially damaging 'red tape' (Theresa May, Equality Strategy Speech (17 November 2010) <www.gov.uk/government/speeches/theresa-maysequality-strategy-speech> accessed 20 November 2010.
characteristics as opposed to the exhaustive list set forth in section 4 of the Equality Act 2010. 69 Furthermore, as far as the UK is concerned, it has a much narrower scope as the prohibition against discrimination only relates to discrimination in the enjoyment of other convention rights rather than being a freestanding right in itself. The Act also has some significance to constitutional law, not simply because it is an Act of Parliament but because of the circumstances of its passage into law.
Despite the novelty of interleaving the explanatory notes with the Bill so as to aid user 68 E.g. slower to embrace such as the grounds of race and disability and the provision of goods and services -as well as being subject to European Law, which gave rise both they not only changed the wording of the definition but also introduced a separate provision making employers liable where they had failed to take reasonable steps and were aware that an employer had been harassed on more than two occasions by a third party. This provision was expanded across the seven relevant protected characteristics for harassment in the Equality Act 2010 but the coalition government considered the provision to be unworkable and an unnecessary burden on business and repealed it in 2013. intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment). This argument carried through to the Equality Act with the Solicitor General saying in committee that
To use the conjunctive approach-the European approach, which is perhaps slightly narrower-would be regression. We would be going back from what we have already done and we are not allowed to do that under the principle of non-regression.
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There is, however, some argument against this proposition. Firstly, when implementing the Framework Employment Equality Directive, as Barmes notes
here was, quite simply, no pre-existing UK law on age, religion and belief or sexual orientation [with] which to compare the Employment Directive' and thus no danger of regression. 93 The choice was open to adopt differences in definition to reflect the differences in characteristic or activity (for example, deleting some of the lesser adjectives regarding the atmosphere whilst retaining protection from the more serious ones) 94 but it was decided to opt for a binary consistency or nothing.
95
Furthermore, the non-regression clause holds that implementation of the directive shall not constitute grounds for a reduction in the level of protection but does not necessarily act as a standstill (which would prevent the reduction of standards absolutely 95 Which in turn led to the curiosity of s 212(5) which allows harassment to be construed as a detriment in circumstances where a provision has disapplied the prohibition on harassment in relation to a specified protected characteristic (s 212(1) holding that generally detriment does not include conducy which amounts to harassment) so that the old direct discrimination claim for harassment can for that characteristic be made. . 113 The arguments advanced in Cabinet discussions were that the primary means of eliminating discrimination should be a conciliation mechanism (or in some fields non-statutory consultation). It was feared that the prospect of criminal proceedings might exacerbate local tensions and prejudice conciliation, with the public/private divide being noted in the minutes:
[t]he Bill already provided heavy criminal sanctions against incitement to racial hatred; but this was an offence against public order and must be differentiated from an infringement of personal rights of a kind which constituted a primarily civil complaint. were to have been brought into force, force employers to recognize where gender pay gaps exist. Identification of the problem should be the first step towards its elimination but currently, in an echo of the 1960s, the government are seeking to achieve equality here through non-statutory means.
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Apart from the specific offences created by the Act, the tenor of enforcement follows the pattern set in the 1960s and seems to lie in the civil sphere with actions primarily being brought by individuals and others in the County Courts or the Employment Tribunal, although proceedings for judicial review, and those relating to immigration and education be brought in appropriate fora (see Part 9 -Enforcement).
There is no mention of any criminal court. Indeed the Equality Act seems to draw a careful line between itself and criminal proceedings. Section 113(7) specifically excludes the application of Part 9 -Enforcement -to proceedings for an 'offence' damages for injury to feelings, which are routinely recoverable in the tort, or for aggravated or exemplary damages.
129
In a step forward for transparency and aiding the fight for equality of pay, the Equality Act 2010 does contain a novel provision that limits the effect of pay 'gagging' clauses. Section 77 provides that terms that purport to prevent or restrict a person from disclosing information about his or her terms or seeking disclosure from colleagues about theirs are unenforceable but only where the disclosure is for the purposes of discovering whether there is a link between the pay for that particular work and a protected characteristic. This was preferred to making pay audits mandatory, with EEF (the manufacturers' organization) recording its members as being strongly against such audits considering them too expensive and burdensome and the government preferring to wait and see what impact voluntary audits have.
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Similar fears as to expense and burden led to the public sector duties being made less bureaucratic. As noted above, the Equality Act 2010 saw the general duty on public authorities to have regard to the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination, promote equality of opportunity and foster good relations, expanded to cover all the protected characteristics but the accompanying specific duties were simplified.
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Thus the government has not sought to use the power in section 155(2) that 'Regulations… may impose duties on a public authority that is a contracting authority within the meaning of the Public Sector Directive in connection with its public procurement functions'. However, the duty on public authorities can be carried 131 Eg requirements to publish all details of engagement with interested parties when determining policies and equality objectives (as well as to publish the equality analysis undertaken and information used within that analysis), detailed data collection formerly required by the RRA 1976 and the obligation to involve disabled people in the creation of the disability equality scheme were all dropped in the simplification process.
horizontally onto contracting businesses, where it is relevant and proportionate to do so, and as the public sector spends up to £175 billion 132 through contracts with the private sector that could amount to significant leverage. 133 The Equality and Human
Rights Commission Guidance suggests including two contract conditionsprohibiting the contractor from unlawfully discriminating under the Equality Act 2010
and requiring them to take all reasonable steps to ensure that staff, suppliers and subcontractors meet their obligations under the Act -which do no more than require them to act lawfully, 134 but there is scope to go further 'if the authority considers it necessary or expedient to do so to enable or facilitate compliance with a duty'. 
